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ABSTRACT 
Security breaches often stem from business partner failures within the value chain. There have been several recent efforts to 
develop a common reference for rating the information risk posed by partners. We develop a simple analytical model to 
examine the impact of such information security ratings on service providers, customers, and social welfare. While some 
might believe that ratings would benefit high-security providers and hurt those with lower security, we show that this is not 
always the case. We find that information security ratings can hurt both types of providers or benefit both, depending on the 
market conditions. Surprisingly, we also find that security ratings do not always benefit the most demanding customers who 
desire highly secure business partners. Yet, in all cases, we find that social welfare is improved when information security 
ratings are adopted. This result suggests that information security ratings should be encouraged through public policy 
initiatives. 
Keywords 
Economics of Information Security, Information Security Rating, IT Policy and Management, Information Systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Outsourcing has been widely adopted in many industries. Within the IT function, the benefits of subcontracting business 
processes have been widely discussed including cost reduction, improved utilization of core IS resources, and the acquisition 
of new technical skills and competencies (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998). Recent technology innovations allowing 
increased network bandwidth, processing virtualization, and inexpensive storage have pushed outsourcing to a new level by 
facilitating the migration of many internal IT applications to externally provided services. In this so called Software as a 
Service (SaaS) model, business applications are provided on demand as a service to customers. SaaS allows firms to reduce 
many fixed costs associated with the required internal IT infrastructure, application deployment, testing, maintenance, and 
patch management. It also lowers cost through competition. If a firm is not satisfied with a service provider, they can switch 
to another provider without losing significant upfront investments (those investments would represent a sunk cost if the firm 
had entered into a long-term contract with an outsourcing vendor). Furthermore, enterprises using a service-oriented 
architecture (SOA), can segment different processes and outsource them to different service providers. For example, within 
the financial services industry, many institutions rely heavily on both traditional outsourcing and SaaS, employing thousands 
of vendors that support their business processes.  
While these different forms of outsourcing provide enterprise customers with both flexibility and cost benefits, the use of 
external service providers handling sensitive business data introduces new security risks. Many widely publicized security 
breaches have been the result of a partner failure (Macura and Johnson 2009). Sometimes these failures stem from neglect or 
under-investment in security. In other cases, the security challenges arise from the nature of service provider’s business 
model. Providers who frequently enhance their service offering in response to evolving customer demand, introduce the 
possibility of new security bugs with every additional feature. Traditional methods in software assurance, with significant 
code testing, can be time consuming, slowing the vendor’s ability to compete and tempting them to cut corners.  
Of course a second worry is the firm’s sensitive data that may be stored on a service provider’s machines and handled by 
employees of the service provider. That data represents a significant risk because the firm no longer has the ability to directly 
monitor and control its access. Even if the vendor’s network is secure, the firm faces many web-based threats (hacking, 
malicious code etc.) when data is moving from the service provider’s facility over the Internet. Lastly, service providers often 
employ a model of multi-tenancy, where many enterprise customers share the same business application infrastructure with 
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controlled access to their own data. The challenge for the service provider is segregating the data of customers. Inadequate 
data management may allow one firm’s data to be exposed to another customer, which may be a competitor in the same 
industry.  
For all of these reasons, firms must assess the information security level of their partners. Traditionally, customers perform 
such assessments through surveys, interviews, on-site visits, testing, and document review. Using that information the 
customers typically develop their own risk assessment (through identification of threats and vulnerabilities, control analysis, 
likelihood determination, risk determination etc.) (Stoneburner et al. 2002). This is time-consuming and costly activity for 
both vendors and customers. Since many firms (especially those in the financial industry) have hundreds of service providers, 
the time required to perform the risk assessment can make it impossible to assess every critical service provider.  
Recently there have been several efforts to develop a common risk rating including the BITS shared assessment, security 
vendor assessments (like Symantec’s IT Risk Assessment) and most recently the collaboration between Goldman Sachs, 
Moody’s, and Avior to create a Vendor Information Risk Rating (VIR). For example, in the Moody’s rating, service 
providers who sign up are analyzed and rated in 11 “security fundamentals” categories, including access control, business 
continuity and data security. Two types of ratings are assigned to service providers - overall security quality ratings and 
inherent risk ratings.  The idea behind such ratings is to reduce the burden for both enterprise customers and service providers 
by creating a single efficient risk rating (Kark 2008) that can be used by many (rather and each firm individually assessing 
each of their vendors)  
Kliger and Sarig (2000) examined security price reactions to Moody's refinement of its rating system and found that rating 
information was valuable. While prior financial literature assumes that credit rating benefits the high-credit issuer while hurts 
the low-credit issuer (Kliger and Sarig 2000), we want to examine whether this classical insight can be readily applied to the 
risk rating in the IS field, where the vendor competition can be affected by the risk rating.  
In this paper, we develop an analytical model to examine the impact of information security rating on service providers, 
customers, and social welfare. We do this by comparing two cases: (1) the case where an information security rating is 
provided, and (2) the case where it is not provided. While it is tempting to directly equate information security rating with 
ratings of financial instruments, security ratings are quite different from credit ratings (which measure the default probability 
for a debt issuer). A good credit rating generally enables the debt issuer to raise money from the financial market at a lower 
cost. However, a good security rating does not necessarily benefit a high-security service provider because the security rating 
may have subtle impacts on the competition among service providers, their incentives to improve security levels, and their 
prices charged to customers. For example, it is commonly believed that information security ratings benefit high-security 
service providers (and conversely hurts low-security providers). However, we find a surprising result: information security 
ratings can hurt or benefit both types of service providers, depending on the market conditions. Likewise, our analysis leads 
to another counterintuitive result: information security rating can hurt demanding customers. Prior results in the licensing 
literature claimed that improved information always benefits the high-needs customers at the cost of less demanding 
customers (Shapiro 1986). We find cases where that is not true for information security.  
We begin by examining the related literature. In Section 2, we present our model. We analyze the case with and without 
ratings in Sections 4-5. We then conclude with recommendations for researchers and policy makers. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A growing literature has examined the economics of information security from several different perspectives. Gal-Or  and 
Ghose (2005) examined the value of information sharing about security breaches between competing firms. Kannan and R. 
Telang (2005) compared a market-based mechanism and a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) mechanism for 
vulnerability disclosure. They found that the former mechanism almost always underperforms the latter one. Arora, Telang 
and Xu (2008) further examined CERT’s optimal timing of disclosing a vendor’s software vulnerability. They found that the 
vendor may release the patch later than is socially optimal when there is no forced disclosure. Thus, social planners could 
push the vendor to release the patch more quickly by threatening to disclose its software vulnerabilities. Arora, Caulkins, and 
Telang (2006) used an analytical model to show that a software vendor may have incentives to release buggier software early 
and patch it later in a larger market. August and Tunca (2006) examined alternative policies to manage network security in a 
network where vulnerabilities exhibit negative network externalities. They showed how the most effective policy is 
determined by the security risk and patching costs. August and Tunca (2008) further studied whether the users of unlicensed 
software should be provided the ability to apply security patches. They showed how the joint effects of software piracy and 
negative network security externalities affect the optimal policy choices. We examine the effects of vendor information 
security rating, which was not directly addressed in these papers. 
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2. THE MODEL 
We adopt a vertical differentiation framework (see, for example, Bhargava and Choudhary [2001, 2008]) for customers who 
have different usage utilities for a business application service. We model two risk-neutral representative customers: (1) low-
type customer, whose usage utility from using the business application service is 0V > , and (2) high-type customer, whose 
usage utility from using the business application service is Vθ  with 1θ > .  
A service provider exerts effort e  ( [ ]0 1 )e∈ ,  to increase the information security level of its service offering. We normalize 
the threat probability, the probability that the vendor is breached, to 1 e− . That is, when the service provider exerts greater 
efforts, it is less likely to be breached. The fixed cost of exerting effort e  on security is assumed to be a convex function: 
2ce , where 0c >  is the security cost parameter (Bhargava and Choudhary 2001). Consistent with prior literature (August 
and Tunca 2006), when a breach occurs, the customer incurs a loss proportional to its usage utility. We use Vλ  and Vλθ  to 
denote the loss of the low-type customer and the high-type customer respectively, where 0 1λ< < .  
ASSUMPTION 1: To focus on the interior solution, we assume that 1V cθλ / < , which ensures that the optimal efforts of 
both the low-security service provider ( )le∗  and high-security service provider ( )he∗  are less than 1.  
Two service providers engage in a two-period competition. The sequence of events are as follows. In Period 0, the service 
providers determine their efforts on security level. If an information security rating is provided in Period 1, the customers will 
know the efforts (or security levels) of both service providers. However, if a rating is not provided in Period 1, then the 
security levels of both service providers are unobservable to customers in Period 1. However, in time customers will 
eventually know the service providers’ security levels in Period 2 via the customers’ individual assessments or a reputation 
mechanism (e.g. academic publications, newspaper, word-of-mouth among customers etc.). This means that the information 
security rating agencies are more efficient than individual customers or the reputation mechanism (Kark 2008).  
Both service providers announce their prices in both periods; customers make choices based on their preferences and the 
information available to them.  
For ease of exposition, we use le  and he  to denote lower and higher effort (or security level) respectively. lp  and hp  denote 
lower and higher price charged by service providers. lπ  and hπ  denote the total profit of lower and higher-security service 
provider in both periods. Next we analyze two cases: (1) an information security rating is provided in Period 1, and (2) a 
rating is not provided in Period 1.  
3. Competition with Information Security Rating 
Information security ratings reveal the efforts of service providers to customers in Period 1. Hence, customers know le  and 
he  in both periods. The competition in Period 1 is the same as that in Period 2. Hence, in Period 2, a service provider charges 
the same price as that charged in Period 1; a customer chooses the same service provider as that chosen in Period 1. Thus, we 
only need to focus on a single period.  
We use ( )U t s p, ,  to denote the net surplus of a type- t  customer who uses a business application service with a security 
level of s  and a price of p , where Lt t=  (low-type customer) or Ht  (high-type customer); Ls s=  (lower security level) or 
Hs  (higher security level); lp p=  or hp . The expressions of ( )U t s,  are as follows.  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
L L l l l l l
L H h h h hh
H L l l l ll
H H h h h hh
U t s p e V p e V p
U t s p e V p e V p
U t s p e V p e V p
U t s p e V p e V p
λ
λ
θ λ θ
θ λ θ
 
  
      
      
       
      
      
       
      
      
       
, , = − + − − −
, , = − + − − −
, , = − + − − −
, , = − + − − −
 
 
If both service providers stay in the market (i.e. high-security service provider sells to the high-type customer while low-
security service provider sells to the low-type customer), then the low-security service provider can capture the low-type 
customer by charging a price lp such that (IC1) ( ) ( )L L l L H hU t s p U t s p, , ≥ , ,  (the low-type customer chooses the low-security 
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service provider rather than the high-security service provider) and (IR1) ( ) 0L L lU t s p, , ≥  (the low-type customer does not 
suffer a loss from using the service of the low-security service provider). Similarly, the high-security service provider should 
charge a price hp such that (IC2) ( ) ( )H H h H L lU t s p U t s p, , ≥ , ,  and (IR2) ( ) 0H H hU t s p, , ≥ .  
It can be shown that both IR1 and IC2 are active and that IR2 and IC1 can be neglected. Using IR1 and IC2, we get  
 
( )1
1
l l
h l lh
p V e
p V e e V e
λ λ
θλ λ λ      
   
= − +
= − + − +
 (1) 
 
The total profits of high-security service provider and low-security service provider in two periods can be written as follows.  
 
2
2
2
2
l l l
h h h
p ce
p ce
π
π
= −
= −
 (2) 
 
Inserting (1) in (2) and solving the first-order condition (F.O.C.) for optimal efforts, we obtain le∗  and he∗ . The second order 
conditions are satisfied because 2 2 2 2 2 0l l h hd de d de cπ π/ = / = − < .  
 
Proposition 1. When an information security rating is provided to customers in the first period, then the optimal efforts of 
high-security and low-security service provider to enhance security level are given by  
 
l
h
e V c
e V c
λ
θλ
∗
∗
= / ,
= / .
 
The prices and profits of both service providers are given by ( )1 1lp V V cλ λ∗  = − − /  , 
( ) ( )2 2 1 1 1hp V c V V cλ θ θ λ λ∗  = − / + − − /  , ( )2 2l V V cπ λ λ
∗  = − − /  , ( ) ( )
22 21 2 2h V c V V cπ θ λ λ λ
∗  = − / + − − /  .  
 
Next, we show that the high-security service provider does not have any incentives to compete the low-security service 
provider out of the market in equilibrium. If that happened, both types of customers would choose the high-security service 
provider even though the low-security service provider charges 0lp = . That is, the high-security service provider must 
charge a price such that ( ) ( ) 0lL H h L L l pU t s p U t s p =, , ≥ , , | , ( ) ( ) 0lH H h H L l pU t s p U t s p =, , ≥ , , | . This leads to 
minh h l h l h lp V e e V e e V e eθλ λ λ
      ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
      
       
≤ − , − = − . Hence, if the high-security service provider charges h h lp V e eλ
 ∗ ∗
 
 
= − , it 
will obtain a profit of 
2
4h h hp c eπ
 ∗
 
 
= −  instead of 
2
2h h hp c eπ
 ∗ ∗ ∗
 
 
= − . However, 
( ) ( )2 22 1 3 3 0Vh h c c Vπ π λ λ θ θ∗  − = − + − + >   given 0 1λ< <  and 1θ > . Therefore, two service providers share the market 
in equilibrium as shown in Proposition 1.  
4. Competition without Information Security Rating  
In this section, we examine the case of competition where no information security rating is provided. We focus on the 
rational expectations equilibrium (Muth 1961), where customers form expectations on security levels of service providers, 
and the expectations are unbiased in equilibrium. That is, l lE e e
 ∗ ∗
 
 
=  and h hE e e
 ∗ ∗
 
 
= . The efforts of service providers remain 
unknown to customers in Period 1. Thus, both service providers appear identical to customers, and they charge the same 
introductory price ip ; customers randomly choose a service provider in Period 1. We use ( )U t p,  to denote the net surplus 
of a type- t  customer who randomly chooses a service provider.  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
L i L L i L H i
H i H L i H H i
U t p E U t s p E U t s p
U t p E U t s p E U t s p
   
      
   
      
, = , , + , , ,
, = , , + , , ,
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where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1L L i l i l iE U t s p E e V p E e V pλ             , , = − + − − − , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1L H i h i h iE U t s p E e V p E e V pλ
    
         
, , = − + − − − , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1H L i l i l iE U t s p E e V p E e V pθ λ θ             , , = − + − × − − , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1H H i h i h iE U t s p E e V p E e V pθ λ θ
    
         
, , = − + − − − .  
There are two possible scenarios in equilibrium: (S1) only the high-type customer can afford the introductory price ip  in 
Period 1, and (S2) both types of customers can afford ip  in Period 1.  
In the first scenario (S1), the expected demand of each service provider is 12 . The introductory price ip  is set to satisfy 
( ) 0H iU t p, = , or ( ) ( ) ( )121i l hp V V E e E eθ λ λθ    = − + + . In Period 2, service providers charge different prices ( hp  and lp ) 
because their efforts on security are revealed to customers via a reputation mechanism. Using a similar argument as that in 
Section 3, we get ( )1l lp V eλ λ= − +  and ( ) ( )1h h l lp V e e V eθλ λ λ= − + − + . The profits of low-security and high-security 
service providers can be expressed as: 212l i l lp p ceπ = + −  and 
21
2h i h hp p ceπ = + − . We obtain the optimal efforts by solving 
the first order conditions of service providers.  
In the second scenario (S2), the expected demand of each service provider is 1 . The introductory price ip  satisfies 
( ) 0L iU t p, = , or ( ) ( ) ( )121i l hp V V E e E eλ λ    = − + + . In Period 2, service providers charge lp  and hp  respectively when 
their efforts are revealed. The profits can be expressed as: 2l i l lp p ceπ = + −  and 
2
h i h hp p ceπ = + − . Again, we obtain the 
optimal efforts by solving the F.O.C. It can be shown that the second order conditions are satisfied.  
Comparing the maximum profits obtained from S2 and from S1, we find that when 2θ > , the maximum profits of both 
service providers in S1 are greater than those in S2. We summarize the results in the following proposition. The detailed 
proof is in the Appendix.  
 
Proposition 2. When 2θ > , the optimal efforts of high-security and low-security service provider to enhance security level 
are given by  
 
( ) ( )
( )
4 8
5 8
l
h
e V c
e V c
λ θ
θλ
∗
∗
= + / ,
= / .
 
The prices and profits of both service providers are given by ( ) ( )28 8 1 2 3Vi cp c Vθ λ λ θ∗  = − + +  , 
( ) ( )28 8 1 4Vl cp c Vλ λ θ∗  = − + +  , ( ) ( )2 28 8 1 4 4 3Vh cp c Vλ λ θ θ∗  = − + + −  , ( )( ) ( )
2 2
64 [32 2 1 11 8 16 ]Vl c c Vπ θ λ λ θ θ∗ = × + − + + + , 
( )( ) ( )2 264 32 2 1 19 16 32Vh c c Vπ θ λ λ θ θ∗  = + − + − +  . Only the high-type customer can afford ip
∗
 in Period 1. 
When 1 2θ< ≤ , the optimal efforts of high-security and low-security service provider to enhance security level are given by  
 
( )
( ) ( )
3 4
1 2 4
l
h
e V c
e V c
λ
λ θ
∗
∗
= / ,
= + / .
 
Both service providers only sell to the high-type customer in Period 1. The prices and profits of both service providers are 
given by ( ) ( )24 4 1 2Vi cp c Vλ λ θ∗  = − + +  , ( )
2
4 4 1 3Vl cp c Vλ λ
 ∗
 
 
= − + , ( ) ( )2 24 [4 1 2 2 3 ]Vh cp c Vλ λ θ θ∗ = − + − + , 
( ) ( ) ( )22 1 11 4 16l V V cπ λ λ θ∗  = − + + /  , ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 1 4 8 19 16h V V cπ λ λ θ θ∗  = − + − + /  . Both types of customers can 
afford ip
∗
 in Period 1.  
 
When information security ratings are not available, service providers appear identical to customers. Thus, the service 
providers cannot segment the market by selling to different types of customers. Instead, service providers have the same 
chance to sell to a specific type of customer. When the high-type customer has sufficiently high willingness-to-pay for the 
business application service (θ  sufficiently large, 2θ > ), the target customer is high-type customer only. Otherwise, target 
customers are both types of customers.  
5. Comparison: with Information Security Rating and without Information Security Rating 
We use Case NR to denote the case where the information security rating is not provided in Period 1, and Case R to denote 
the case where the information security rating is provided in Period 1.  
Free-riding arises in Case NR because the low-security service provider can claim to be a “high-security service provider”. 
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Intuitively, the free-riding problem should reduce the high-security service provider’s incentive to invest in security. But, it is 
not obvious how the low-security service provider’s security effort is affected. There are two conflicting effects. First, the 
low-security service provider appears identical to the high-security service provider in Period 1, so it could have incentives to 
enhance its security level to increase the willingness-to-pay of customers. Second, the low-security provider still needs to 
maintain an appropriate differentiation with the high-security provider in Period 2 to avoid an intense price competition after 
efforts are known to customers. Since the free-riding reduces the high-security provider’s effort on security, the low-security 
provider could also reduce its effort to keep an appropriate differentiation with the high-security provider.  
 
Proposition 3. When an information security rating is not available, free-riding reduces the security effort of the high-
security service provider. It also reduces the security effort of the low-security service provider when 1 4θ< ≤ , but increases 
its effort when 4θ > .  
 
When 2θ > , only the high-type customer can afford the introductory price ( ip∗ ) in Period 1 of Case NR (see Proposition 2). 
In Period 1 of Case NR, the low-security service provider sells to the high-type customer instead of the low-type customer (in 
Case R). When the high-type customer’s taste is sufficiently large ( 4θ > ), the low-security service provider will increase its 
effort on security because the gains from the high-type customer in Period 1 exceeds the loss from a narrower differentiation 
between the two service providers, which can cause intense price competition in Period 2.  
 
Proposition 4. The information security rating benefits both service providers when 54θ < . It hurts both service providers 
when 2θ >  and ( )( )( )
2 96 45 112
32 2 1
V
c
λ θ θ
θ λ
 + − 
− −
> . It benefits the high-security service provider but hurts the low-security service provider 
in other regions.  
 
It might seem intuitive that the information security rating always helps the high-security provider but hurts the low-security 
provider. Proposition 4 shows that it is not always the case. The reason is that information security rating generates two 
effects on the competition: (1) It eliminates the free riding problem. This effect helps two service providers to differentiate 
themselves.1 Thus, the information security rating can benefit both service providers when both types of customers are not 
significantly differentiated ( 54θ < ). (2) It can intensify the competition in Period 1. In Case NR, when 2θ > , the high-
security provider can extract all the surplus from the high-type customer while the low-security provider can charge a high 
price by free-riding on the high-security provider. However, these benefits for both service providers are gone when the 
information security rating is provided. When it is hard to enhance the security ( c  is large), it will be useful for service 
providers to soften their competition. Thus, the information security rating, which can intensify the competition, may hurt 
both service providers.  The following table gives numerical examples to illustrate the results of Proposition 4.  
 
θ  c  With risk rating Without risk rating Comparison 
1.2 1 1.64lπ
∗ = , 1.6416hπ
∗ =  1.6395lπ
∗ = , 1.6379hπ
∗ =  RR Benefits both vendors 
3 1 1.64lπ
∗ = , 1.8hπ
∗ =  2.0869lπ
∗ = , 2.0969hπ
∗ =  RR hurts both vendors 
3 0.2 1.8lπ
∗ = , 2.6hπ
∗ =  2.4344lπ
∗ = , 2.4844hπ
∗ =  
0.2λ = ,  
1V =  
1.5 1 1.64lπ
∗ = , 1.65hπ
∗ =  1.6425lπ
∗ = , 1.64hπ
∗ =  
RR Benefits the high-
security vendor but hurts 
the low-security one 
 
Proposition 5. The information security rating does not affect the low-type customer, whose net surplus is always zero. It 
benefits the high-type customer except when 12θ > , ( )
8
3 3 4 1
θ
θ
λ
−
< < , and ( )( )
2 12
8 1
VV c λ θ
λ
λθ −
−
< ≤ .  
                                                          
1In Case R, ( )1Vh l ce e λ θ
∗ ∗− = − . In Case NR, ( )2 1Vh l ce e λ θ
∗ ∗− = −  for both S1 and S2. Clearly, ( ) ( )21 1V Vc cλ λθ θ− > − , showing 
that the difference between he
∗
 and le
∗
 in Case R is larger than that in Case NR.  
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This result is different from Shapiro (1986), which showed that improved information always helps the high-type customer. 
The reason is that Shapiro (1986) assumed that the market is fully competitive with no profit for the sellers while we do not 
make such an assumption. Footnote 10 of Shapiro (1986) suggested that modeling heterogeneous sellers would permit the 
analysis of issues not modeled in that paper. The sellers in our paper are heterogeneous.  
Intuitively, information security rating helps the high-type customer to choose the high-security service provider, and thus 
benefits the high-type customer. Hence, it seems quite counterintuitive that the information security rating can hurt the high-
type customer. The reasons are as follows. Although information security rating encourages the high-security service 
provider to enhance its security, it can reduce the low-security service provider’s effort on its security (when 4θ > , see 
Proposition 3).Then, the high-type customer’s alternative choice (low-security service provider) in Period 2 is worse than that 
when the rating is not provided. This means that the high-security provider need not give the high-type customer a high net 
surplus to lobby it not to choose the low-security provider. Therefore, the information security rating can hurt the high-type 
customer.  
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 have important managerial implications for the business model of the information security 
rating industry. For examples, the Moody’s rating service charged service providers to conduct the assessment and also 
charged customers interested in the providers rating (the ratings were not publically available, but rather were provided for a 
fee). Our results suggest that it is not a good business model under certain conditions (for example, when both service 
providers are hurt by the information security rating). As shown above, the information security rating has quite subtle effects 
on competition, the business application service providers, and customers. The information security rating agencies must 
understand these effects to assess the customers and service providers willingness to pay for the rating service. Now, we 
examine the impacts of information risk rating on social welfare, which is the total surplus of vendors and consumers (that is, 
a sum of vendor profits and consumer surplus). 
 
Proposition 6. Information security rating increases the social welfare.  
 
Information security rating is a relatively new service compared to credit rating. In 1931, the credit rating was firstly 
endorsed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which required banks to use current market prices for all the 
bonds on their balance sheet rated below “investment grade”. In 1936, the OCC went further and restricted banks from 
buying bonds below “investment grade”. However, the information security rating is still not officially endorsed by the 
government. Proposition 6 suggests that social planners should encourage the information security rating through public 
policy initiatives.  
6. CONCLUSION 
There is growing interest in many industries for vendor information security rating services, which enabled enterprise 
customers to obtain risk assessments of their service providers. We investigate the impact of such risk rating services on 
customers, service providers and social welfare.  
Intuitively, many may conclude that information security ratings should benefit the high-security service providers and hurt 
the low-security ones. But, we find that this is not always the case - information security ratings can hurt both high-security 
and low-security service providers. This occurs when the absence of a security rating softens the competition allowing the 
low-security service provider to appear identical to the high-security service provider. In that case, the low-security provider 
is able to charge a higher price than otherwise and the high-security service provider is able to avoid providing a positive net 
surplus to the high-type customer to guarantee that the customer does not choose the low-security provider. Therefore, it is 
possible that the information security rating can intensify competition and hurt both service providers. On the other hand, in 
some cases information security ratings can benefit both service providers. For example, in cases where the high-type 
customer is not significantly different from the low-type customer, it is useful for both service providers to differentiate their 
services though security to avoid head-to-head price competition. Since ratings clearly reveal the service quality of providers 
to customers, it helps service providers to differentiate themselves and thus can benefit both of them.  
Prior literature showed that improved information always benefits the high-type customer (Shapiro 1986). Our model shows 
that information security rating can hurt the high-type customer. This is because our model captures competition between 
heterogeneous providers while Shapiro (1986) assumed homogeneous providers where profit is competed away. Hence, the 
improved information did not affect the competition in Shapiro’s model. We consider a duopolist competition, where both 
service providers can earn a positive profit. We find that the information security ratings have subtle effects on the 
competition. When the rating is provided, it may reduce the low-security service provider’s incentives to invest in security. 
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This reduces the quality of the alternative choice of the high-type customer. Thus, the high-security service provider will not 
give a sufficiently large net surplus to lure the high-type customer. This explains why the high-type customer can be hurt by 
an information security rating of providers.  
Although the information security rating has subtle effects on service providers and customers respectively, it always 
increases the social welfare. The policy implication is that the information security rating should be encouraged by social 
planners.  
Risk rating is a marketing tool. Future research can compare different marketing tools, e.g. a comparison between risk rating 
and advertisement.  
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1. Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof. ( ) ( )2 22 2 1 2 2l l l l l l l l ld de d p ce de d V e ce de V ceπ λ λ λ         / = − / = − + − / = − . Hence, ( ) 0l ld deπ / =  leads to 
le V cλ
∗ = / . 22h h h h hd de d p ce deπ
 
 
 
/ = − / ( ) ( ) 22 2 1 2 2h l l h h hd V e e V e ce de V ceθλ λ λ θλ   = − + − + − / = − .  
Hence, 0h hd deπ / =  leads to he V cθλ
∗ = / . Inserting le
∗
 and he
∗
 in (1) and (2) gives lp∗ , hp∗ , lπ ∗ , and hπ ∗ .    
3. Proof of Proposition 2 
Proof. In the first scenario (S1), ( ) ( ) ( )121i l hp V V E e E eθ λ λθ    = − + + , ( )1l lp V eλ λ= − + , thus 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 12 2 21 1l i l l l h l lp p ce V V E e E e V e ceπ θ λ λθ λ λ
  
    
= + − = − + + + − + − . Since customers form correct expectations 
Zhou & Johnson  Information Security Rating & Vendor Competition 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 9 
on le  and he , we have ( )l lE e e=  in equilibrium. Inserting ( )l lE e e=  in lπ  and solving the F.O.C. for le∗ , we may get 
( ) ( )4 8le V cλ θ∗ = + / . Using a similar analysis, we may get ( )5 8he V cθλ∗ = / . Inserting le∗  and he∗  in ip , hp , lp , lπ , and 
hπ , we may get ip
∗
, hp
∗
, lp
∗
, lπ
∗
, and hπ
∗
. Using a similar argument, we may get results for the second scenario (S2).  
The difference between hπ
∗
 in S1 and S2 is ( ) ( ) ( )64S1 S2 2Vh h cπ π θ∗ ∗| − | = − ( ) ( )232 1 22 3c Vλ λ θ − + +  . Clearly, it is 
greater than 0 when 2θ > . Further, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )264S1 S2 2 32 1 14 11 0Vl l c c Vπ π θ λ λ θ∗ ∗  | − | = − − + + >   when 2θ > .    
4. Proof of Proposition 3 
Proof. We use the results of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. ( ) ( ) ( )Case R S1 Case NR 3 8 0h he e V cθλ∗ ∗| − | , = / > , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Case R S2 Case NR 2 1 4 0h he e V cλ θ∗ ∗| − | , = − / > . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Case R S1 Case NR 4 8 0l le e V cλ θ∗ ∗| − | , = − / ≥  when 
4θ ≤  but 0<  when 4θ > , ( ) ( ) ( )Case R S2 Case NR 4 0l le e V cλ∗ ∗| − | , = / > .    
5. Proof of Proposition 4 
Proof. When 2θ > , the equilibrium is S1 in Case NR (see proof of Proposition 2). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 264Case R S1 Case NR 45 112 96 32 2 1Vh h c V cπ π λ θ θ θ λ∗ ∗  | − | , = − + − − −  is greater than zero when 
( )
( )( )
2 96 45 112
32 2 1
V
c
λ θ θ
θ λ
 + − 
− −
> , and less than or equal to zero otherwise.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 264Case R S1 Case NR [ 11 8 48 32 2 1 ] 0Vl l c V cπ π λ θ θ θ λ∗ ∗| − | , = − + − − − − < . When 1 2θ< ≤ , the equilibrium is 
S2 in Case NR (see proof of Proposition 2). 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 216Case R S2 Case NR 12 24 13 0Vh h cλπ π θ θ∗ ∗| − | , = − + >  in (1 2]θ ∈ , .  
( ) ( ) ( )2 216Case R S2 Case NR 5 4 0Vl l cλπ π θ∗ ∗| − | , = − >  in 54(1 )θ ∈ ,  but 0≤  in 54[ 2]θ ∈ , .    
6. Proof of Proposition 5 
Proof. Let Chns  be the net surplus of the high-type customer in Case C  ( C NR= , R ).  
( ) ( ) 222 1R Vh H H h cns U t s p c c Vθ λ λ   = , , = − − + . When 1 2θ< ≤ ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )24 1 8 1 5NR Vh H i H H h cns U t p U t s p c Vθ λ λ θ = , + , , = − − + +  . ( )
2 2 2
4 4 3 0
R NR V
h h cns ns
λ θ θ− = − − > . When 2θ > ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )280 1 8 1 4NR Vh H i H H h H H h cns U t p U t s p U t s p c Vθ λ λ θ = , + , , = + , , = − × − + +  . 
( ) ( ) ( )28 1 8 1 12 0R NR Vh h cns ns c Vθ λ λ θ − = − − + − >   when 
( )
( )
2 12
8 1
V
c
λ θ
λ
−
−
> . According to Assumption 1, c Vλθ> . Only when 
( )
( )
2 12
8 1
V Vλ θ
λ
λθ−
−
> , ( )( )
2 12
8 1
VV c λ θ
λ
λθ −
−
< ≤  is possible. Solving the inequality ( )( )
2 12
8 1
V Vλ θ
λ
λθ−
−
> , we get 12θ >  and ( )
8
3 3 4 1
θ
θ
λ
−
< < .    
7. Proof of Proposition 6 
Proof. Let CSW  be the social welfare in Case C (C=NR, R). Note that the net surplus of the low-type customer is zero, we 
have ( )( ) ( )* * 2 22 1 1 1 .R Rh h l V c VcSW ns θ λ λ θπ π  + − + +  = + + = .  
When 2θ > , ( )( ) 2 232 32 2 1 1 8 8 19NR NR Vh h l cSW ns c Vπ π θ λ λ θ θ
  ∗ ∗
  
   
= + + = + − + + + ;  
( ) ( )2 2 2321 13 8 24 0R NR V cSW SW V λλ θ θ− = − + − + > . When 1 2θ< ≤ , ( ) ( ) 2 28 16 1 1 5 6 4NR VcSW c Vθ λ λ θ θ       = + − + + + ; 
( )2 2 28 4 6 3 0R NR V cSW SW λ θ θ− = − + >  in (1 2]θ ∈ , .    
 
